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Abstract 
The research presented here explores the relationship between games and the economic 
environment in which the game might be embedded. In particular, the focus is on a 
market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow-on stage 
oj strategic interaction. Many instruments found in markets, such as insurance 
contracts and warranties, have that property and motivate the study. The central 
question posed is how the game and the market, two different types of processes, 
interact. Traditionally two sets of theory are applied to each of the separate processes: 
one relates to price formation in the market and the other involves modeling the follow­
on stage of interaction as a game. However the application becomes ambiguous when 
the game has multiple solutions. Consequently, it is not clear from theory how or if 
joint convergence of the two processes might evolve. The study focuses on that issue 
and the results demonstrate that outcomes in the game are systematically linked to 
outcomes in the market. The game outcomes can be characterized by traditional game­
theoretic solution concepts. Moreover, the market converges to a competitive 
equilibrium consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game. 
1 · Introduction
Markets for Contracts: 
Experiments Exploring the Compatibility 
of Games and Markets for Games 
Charles R. Plottt Dean V. Williamson:J: 
The research presented here examines the compatibility of game theoretical models 
with the classical model of market equilibrium. The experimental approach is 
"exploratory" in the sense that it is motivated by questions of economic behavior in the 
context of institutions even though there is neither good theory nor a clear line of 
previous experiments that point to what might be expected. Yet, the experiments seem 
tQ be central to both the thrust of theory and applications of theory. Thus, we will 
report on the outcomes of data generated in a particular institutional setting. While the 
models we apply are very suggestive, we leave open to speculation and further theory a 
more fundamental explanation of what we report. 
The experimental design links a market process to a contract process. A contract is 
modeled as a game, and the purchase and sale of contracts (or games) is modeled as a 
market. The market involves the purchase and sale of rights to participate in a follow­
on stage of strategic interaction (the game). Compatibility concerns how the two 
different processes - games and markets -- interact when they exist side by side as 
subsystems in economic environments. Are the equilibria in the two processes 
reinforcing, each promoting the convergence of the other process, or do they confound 
convergence? Is the selection of equilibrium in one process systematically linked to the 
selection of equilibrium in the other? Of course, the focus on institutions produces a 
deeper question about which we can only speculate: what dynamic process drives the 
joint selection of equilibrium in the two processes. 
Clearly there are many alternative environments in which a study such as this could be 
initiated. The setting we chose reflects many arbitrary components in part, because 
there seemed to be no obviously unique place to begin. Contracting problems and even 
markets for contracts emerge naturally and abundantly in the context of industrial 
organization. Procurement contracts, for example, engage buyers and suppliers in 
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strategic interactions that can be modeled as principal-agent games, and such contracts 
are often awarded to suppliers via market mechanisms such as auctions. Equity and 
debt certificates ("stocks and bonds") constitute contracts that confer various rights 
over the control of corporations and can thus be modeled as games. Obviously these 
contracts are exchanged in markets. Futures contracts engage buyers and suppliers in a 
game that involves follow-on delivery of goods and services. Insurance contracts are 
clearly a case o{markets for games. The insurance contract involves the insurer and the 
insured in classic relationships of moral hazard. Wage contracts frequently can be 
viewed as games involving principle-agent components, and of course the labor market 
is for the contract. Guarantees and warranties that accompany sales are in fact simply 
games. Thus the purchase and sale of games is common and arise naturally in the 
course of commerce. In all such cases two equilibrating processes exist side by side -­
the market process and the game. The problems are pervasive.1 
It is interesting to note that even though markets for games appear frequently in the 
applied literature, there is no explicit study of their compatibility. It is typically . 
assumed that equilibria in both markets and games must be jointly determined and that 
. the joint convergence of the two processes would conform to the convergence each of 
the two processes would obtain in isolation. The possibility that conduct in one process 
might confound convergence in the other process is not raised. For example, previous 
realizations of conduct in the game might setup price dynamics in the market that in 
turn would disrupt agents' expectations of successive conduct in the game. 
Alternatively, agents might maintain diverse expectations. In contexts involving 
multiple equilibria, expectations might fail to become aligned on particular equilibria. 
Furthermore markets have properties, such as the fact that they are continuous time 
processes, that are abstracted away in most theory. The influence that such variables 
might have is not obvious. 
The results reported here are striking. Equilibria in the game are found to be 
systematically linked to competitive equilibria in the market. The convergence of the
market to equilibria lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to equilibria,
· 
and the 
games move quickly to a solution of the game even though the market was in 
substantial disequilibrium. The markets then settled into the equilibrium that would 
exist if rational expectations prevailed, i.e., if agents were able to predict perfectly what 
1 For example the original research questions were motivated by contracting problems that pertain to the 
financing of Mediterranean trade in the late Middle Ages. The prominent features of the organization of 
the Mediterranean trade, it turns out, emerge in a natural class of problems. The Mediterranean trade 
problem involves the joint equilibration of markets for traded commodities, of markets for agency 
contracts, and of principal-agent games. Specifically, the Mediterranean trade implicates the 
simultaneous equilibration of (geographically dispersed) markets. Coordination between these markets 
involves inputs from dispersed agents, and the contracting of these inputs generates a sequence of 
strategic interactions (games). Multiple equilibria may emerge in the games that obtain between the 
various functionaries of trade. 
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the outcome of the game would be. Thus, the research demonstrates that equilibria in 
games and in the institutional contexts in which they are embedded can be jointly 
determined and of course that fact suggests that institutional context might influence 
selection. 
· . 
The paper proceeds in 5 parts. The next segment, Part II, relates the research to other 
work on equilibrium selection. Parts III and IV detail the experimental design, and Part 
V presents the models and predictions. Results are presented in Part VI, and Part VII 
concludes. 
2 Background and Experimental Research 
The research was motivated chiefly by the two observations. 1) Markets for contracts 
emerge in a broad range of applied contexts, and 2) the success with which certain types 
of solution concepts are able to characterize play in a game seems to depend on the 
institutional context in which the game is embedded. In some contexts, for example, 
traditional solution concepts help characterize play in a particular game whereas in 
other contexts they fail to characterize play in that same game. These contexts generally 
involve multiplicity of equilibria in games and the attendant problem of equilibrium 
selection. Much experimental research on games has approached problems such as the 
selection of equilibria by examining behaviors in increasingly simple environments, and 
yet other experimental research suggests that institutional context helps resolve the 
selection of equilibria in games. 
Three branches of research suggest that the behavior in games can be influenced by 
placing the game in particular institutional environments. First, Cooper, De Jong, 
Forsythe, and Ross 1993, 1994 and Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990, 1991, and 1993 
study special ways of allocating rights to participate in games. They suggest that prices 
might play a role in a process of forward induction that facilitates equilibrium selection. 
Secondly, research on "cheap talk" suggests that embedding particular games in. 
contexts that permit specially tailored pre-game communication can promote the 
selection of equilibria. This research also points to a concept of forward. (See the 
survey of Crawford 1998. Examples include Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross 1989 
and 1992.) 
A third body of research points to the possibility of very different institutional 
influences. It suggests that in properly structured environments variables exist that are 
unanticipated by game theory and may dominate or even confound convergence. 
Examples abound of games in which behaviors fail to line up with predictions in even 
starkly simple strategic contexts. (See Camerer and Thaler 1995 for examples.) The 
resulting paradoxes have motivated exciting lines of research. Implicit in some of this 
research is that the shortcomings of theory results from 1) the failure of theory to 
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incorporate psychology that routinely emerges in strategic interactions, or 2) the failure 
of human actors to satisfy the cognitive competencies required of traditional 
conceptualizations of "rationality." Behavioral game theory, for example, has involved 
efforts to innovate new equilibrium solution concepts, such as Mathew Rabin's 
"Fairness Equilibrium," that are informed by research in psychology. (See Rabin 1993 
and Camerer 1997.) Related research has responded by operationalizing concepts such 
as "altruism" (See, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey 1992, Eckel and Grossman 1996, 
Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe 1996), "spitefulness"(Levine 1997), "manners"(Camerer and 
Thaler 1995), "fairness norms" (Kagel, Kim and Moser 1996), and "trust" (Berg, 
Dickhaut, McCabe 1995). Other research more closely linked to the evolutionary game 
theory literature has involved efforts to operationalize concepts of bounded rationality 
(Stahl and Wilson 1995, Stahl 1996) and by articulating dynamic processes by which 
"conventions" or "stable" outcomes emerge. (See, for example, Crawford 1991, 1995 
Van Huyck et. al. 1995, Van Huyck, Cook, Battalio 1997.) 
The research presented here takes up a tack that is parallel to the research on special 
theories of equilibrium selection in games and the role of institutions in facilitating 
equilibrium selection and is complementary to the research that merges economics with 
psychological considerations and cognitive processes. Rather than focus on 
increasingly simple environments we focus on games that take place in a more 
institutional context -- a context that incorporates many of the features of situations for 
which applications of the theory are intended. In particular, we examine an 
environment in which 1) agents assume diverse roles and 2) payoffs are private 
information. In contrast, previous research on the role of institutions in equilibrium 
selection involved environments in which agents were symmetric and in which payoffs 
could be credibly modeled as common knowledge. Such environments could support 
processes suggestive of forward induction. In the research presented here, the structure 
of strategic interactions does not obviously accommodate behaviors that can be 
characterized by forward induction. Prices do not provide an unambiguous means of 
signaling behaviors in the follow-on game. Instead, equilibria of the game map into 
equilibria of the market process in an intuitively accessible way that can also be 
characterized by backward induction. As will become obvious, the compatibility of the 
concept of a market and a game theoretic equilibrium will be established, whether or 
not the vehicle was forward induction or backward induction is left open to 
speculation. 
Simpler environments have permitted sophisticated applications of theory. For 
example, Crawford and Broseta (1998) present a theoretical framework on learning 
dynamics that they apply to the experimental results of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 
(1990, 1991, and 1993). (Also see Cheung and Friedman 1998 on learning dynamics.) 
Within these environments researchers have initiated a process of attempting to "work 
up" from basic principles to characterizations of dynamic processes that drive 
equilibration and selection in games. Of course, how one might go about generalizing 
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theory developed in the special environments they studied to more complex settings is 
still in the realm of the unknown. The literature does contain suggestions such as 
provided by the spirit of Crawford and Broseta (1998), which may yet be generalized to 
accommodate environments that feature private information. By contrast, the research 
presented here works down from a more complex institutional environment -- an 
environment in which we lose the power of theorjes of learning dynamics. We provide 
an "exploratory leap" into a more complex setting and report what we see in hope that 
by working from "both ends" appropriate theory will be more rapidly developed. 
3 Design Overview 
The experimental design involves a market institution in which agents buy and sell 
rights to participate in a follow-on game. The questions to be posed are whether or not 
outcomes in the game are systematically linked to outcomes in the market, and whether 
or not the game outcomes can be characterized by traditional game-theoretic solution 
concepts. Moreover, the question is whether or not outcomes in the market correspond 
to competitive equilibria, and if the competitive equilibria in the market map uniquely 
into equilibria in the game. 
Game buyers were given redemption values for the number of games that were 
purchased in a market. That is, games were considered a commodity with a declining 
value for marginal units. Accordingly, the buyer generated some utility for playing the 
game independent of any of the outcomes of the game. Of course if the game is 
interpreted as a contract it would mean that the contract had value independent of what 
the consequences of its execution might be. 
Game sellers were given costs for the number of games sold. These cost schedules 
reflected increasing marginal costs. The seller could, in a sense, "produce" the game at 
a cost and then sell it in the market for a price. In the context of a contract sale of. a unit 
my be interpreted as the seller selling a commodity or service under a contract and the 
production of the commodity or service having a cost independent of whatever might 
be involved in the execution of the associated contract. 
If the game had no additional value to either the buyer or seller the demand and supply 
functions induced in the market by application of the competitive model would be as 
shown in Figure 1. The redemption values can be used to produce a market demand 
function and the marginal costs can be used to produce a market supply function. 
All games produced and sold are the same Battle-of-the-Sexes game displayed in Figure 
2. If row player chooses up and column player chooses left the payoff would be 700 to
the row player and 300 to the column player. This matrix was common knowledge. 
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A market was opened for the purchase and sale of the games. Buyers and sellers both 
had the capacity to buy and sell units and so could generate some payoff buying 
trading units at different prices through the course of the market session. After the 
market closed all games were played buy the respective buyers and sellers. Buyers 
always chose among the rows of any game a buyer played and sellers always chose 
among the columns. Each buyer played all games that he or she purchased net of any 
sales. Similarly each seller played all games that he or she sold net of any purchases. 
However, the pairings of the play did not necessarily match the pairings of the market 
transactions. That is, a buyer who purchased two games would make two choices but 
the other player would not necessarily be the player who sold the games to this 
particular buyer. The pairings for play of the game were random and the identities of 
players were not known. The only things known at the time of play of the game were 
the number of game purchased and sold, the prices at which transactions took place in 
the market and the history of aggregate play in previous plays of the game. These 
aspects of information will be made more precise in the following section. 
The total payoff of buyers was the profit from the market, the sum of the difference 
between the redemption values of units and the prices paid plus the sum of the payoffs 
from all games played. The total payoff to a seller was sum of the difference between 
selling prices and cost of units plus the payoffs from all games played. So, payoffs were 
determined jointly between the prices in the market and the subsequent patterns of play 
in the games that were bought and sold in the market. 
4 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Four experimental sessions were conducted. The sessions were conducted in 1996 on 
February 14, February 22, November 13, and November 14. Hereafter each 
experimental session will be identified as Feb 14, Feb 22, Nov 13, and Nov 14. 
Respectively, 8, 12, 10, and 14 subjects participated in these four sessions. 
All subjects were students drawn from the Caltech student body. None had experience 
with this particular set of experiments but some may have had experience in either 
markets or games in other experiments. Each experiment employed an even number of 
subjects, half assigned the role of "buyer" and the other half assigned the role of 
"seller." (See the following table): 
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Experimental Number of Number of 
Session Buyers Sellers 
Feb 14 4 4 
Feb 22 6 6 
Nov 13 5 5 
Nov 14 7 7 
In each of four experimental sessions, an even number of agents participated in 
repeated rounds of a two-stage framework. In the first stage of each round agents 
bought or sold rights to participate in a second stage of strategic interaction. Exchange 
was organized via a double auction operationalized with standard software on a 
computer network. Agents were provided with sets of marginal cost schedules or with 
marginal redemption value schedules. Agents used a new schedule in each round. 
Costs and redemption values were denominated in an experimental currency called 
.:;:francs" These marginal cost schedules determined the marginal cost of supplying to 
the market as many as 10 units (called "assets"). Similarly, marginal redemption value 
schedules determined positive marginal payoffs for as many as 10 units that a buyer 
could acquire in the market. The experimenter provided half of the agents with 
marginal cost schedules and the other half with marginal redemption value schedules. 
Those agents with cost schedules were designated "sellers," and the other agents were 
designated "buyers." 
In the first stage of each round, agents purchased and sold assets in a double auction 
that lasted 5 minutes. Buyers and sellers were permitted to speculate or "trade" during 
the process of price formation. That is, buyers could both buy units and resell units and 
sellers could do the same. Total costs and total benefits were determined by the net 
inventories buyers and sellers maintained at the end of each double auction. These 
costs and benefits were recorded on record sheets, and in each round agents' 
inventories were restored to zero. 
After each double auction closed, buyers assumed the right to choose the actions "Up" 
or "Down" in a binary choice process, the Battle-of-the-Sexes game. Sellers assumed 
the right to choose "Left" or "Right". Agents chose one action for each of the units 
they sold or purchased. These action choices were made without knowledge of other 
agents' choices. Agents recorded each of their choices on a separate piece of paper. The 
pieces of paper or "tickets" were color-coded and were labeled with the index number 
of the current round of the experiment and with the an index number assigned to each 
of the agents. Sellers' tickets were printed on green paper whereas buyer's tickets were 
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printed on pink paper. Agents were supplied with ten tickets for each of as many as 22 
rounds of interaction. 
After all agents had chosen their actions� the experimenter shuffled the sellers' tickets 
(the green tickets) and paired each of a seller's tickets with a buyer's ticket. In this way 
sellers' and buyers' tickets were randomly and anonymously matched. The resulting 
pairs dictated ori.e of four possible pairs of payoffs. (The actions and payoffs are 
arrayed in the 2x2 matrix below.) Payoffs were denominated in an experimental 
currency called "francs." For example, a pair of action "Left," "Right" determined 
payoffs of 700 francs to the buyer of that unit and 300 francs to the seller of that unit. 
The experimenter indicated payoffs of 100, 300, or 700, as appropriate on each of the 
buyers' and sellers' tickets. Tickets were re-distributed to the agents, and agents were 
permitted to account their payoffs on an account sheet. 
The aggregate frequencies of choices were public information. After payoffs were 
distributed, the experimenter announced and posted aggregate results from the stage of 
strategic interaction. Posting the results entailed indicting the frequencies with which 
. pairs occurred in each of the four cells of the 2x2 matrix. The four marginal frequencies 
were also posted. Thus both buyers and seller could see the relative frequencies with 
which strategies were chosen. Of course they could not identify the strategy of any 
particular person or persons. 
For each agent, accounting for payoffs entailed 1) summing payoffs indicated on each of 
the returned tickets, 2) summing, as appropriate, total costs or total benefits, and 3) 
identifying revenues or expenditures from the double auction. In turn, summing these 
three quantities generated each agent's total payoff from participation in the two-stage 
process. Agents accounted payoffs at the end of each round. Payoffs from the entire 
experiment were generated by summing the payoffs from each round. 
Notation 
In the succeeding sections we articulate models, predictions, and results. The models 
operationalize mechanical adjustment processes. It is these processes that permit 
examination of the data. Before we proceed, however, we need some notation. 
A realization of the entire two-stage process is a 3-tuple (P, Q, f), and an equilibrium is a 
4-tuple (P*, Q*, p*, q*)2 where 
2 Generically, the marginal distributions (p, 1-p) and (q, 1-q) are not independent, in which case expected 
payoffs must be evaluated with reference to the joint distribution (fuL, fnL, fuR, foL). On the other hand, the 
equilibrium strategies (p*, 1-p*) and (q*, 1-q*) are independent. 
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P = price in the double auction, 
Q = volume in the double auction, 
f = (fuL, foL, fuR, foR) 
frc = relative frequency with which the outcome (r, c) emerges in the succeeding 
second stage of interaction; r E {Up, Down} and c E {Left , Right} and 
fuL +fuR+foL +foR = 1 
(p, 1-p) = (fuL +fuR, foL +foR) = row player's strategy over the strategy set {Up, 
Down}, 
(q, 1-q) = (fuL +foL, fuR+foR) = column player's strategy over the strategy set {Left, 
Right}, 
(p*, q*) ·constitutes a static equilibrium, under some solution concept, of the second 
stage, and 
(P*, Q*) conform to the equilibrium price and quantity in the market. 
Each realization of the second stage is identified by a 4-tuple (fuL, foL, fuR, foL) of relative 
frequencies. Associated with these relative frequencies are marginal frequencies (p, q). 
In an equilibrium of the entire two stage process, (p*, q*) and (P*, Q*) are 
.simultaneously determined. 
The models of market equilibration share a common structure. Given unit payoffs (b, s) 
to buyers and sellers in the second stage (determined under a given solution concept), 
the models of market equilibration satisfy the following: 
P E [D(Q) +b(-)] n [S(Q) - s(·)] 
where D(Q) = inverse demand correspondence, 
S(Q) = inverse supply correspondence, 
b(-) = unit payoff to buyers, under some solution concept, in the 
second stage, 
s(·) = unit payoff to sellers in the second stage, 
and D(Q) +b(·) = derived demand, 
S(Q) - s(-) = derived supply. 
5 Models and Predictions 
A particular advantage of the experimental method is that it permits examination of 
dynamic processes by which equilibria (if any) emerge. Accordingly, analysis of the 
experimental data is organized around both static predictions and dynamic adjustment 
processes. The predictions pertain to the identification of static equilibria (P*, Q*, p*, q*) 
of the two-stage process, to the selection of equilibria, and to the evolution of prices. 
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Models 
The models pertain to prke formation, the determination of volume in the market and 
of action choices in the second stage of the two-stage apparatus, and to the relation (if 
any) of prices to action choices. Specifically, the models include two sets of partial 
equilibrium models: those that characterize equilibration in the second stage process, 
and those that characterize equilibration in the market process. The real power of the 
models, however, derives from the characterization of the simultaneous equilibration of 
the market process and second stage process. Such models link equilibria in the second 
stage with equilibria in the market and raise deep issues about the dynamic processes 
through which coordination between the market and second stage process is achieved 
(if at all). 
· 
The data are examined via three different classes of models. These models can be 
distinguished from each other by the nature of belief formation and the nature of the 
individual decision process. Two types of belief formation, labeled "Cournot 
expectations" and "perfect foresight," are distinguished. Cournot expectations involve 
r_epeated interaction of the entire two-stage process. Agents generate beliefs with 
reference to immediate history of interaction. In particular, determine how to behave in 
the second stage of interaction by referring to the last realization of second stage 
interaction. Perfect foresight, on the other hand, does not implicate interaction across 
rounds. Rather, it is a static concept. Agents forecast (correctly) outcomes in the second 
stage of interaction. In a general equilibrium of the entire two-stage process, beliefs 
implicate the pricing of units. 
Two types of decision-making processes are distinguished, and they are labeled 
"dynamic" and ''partial backward induction." These processes link outcomes in the 
market to outcomes in the second stage of interaction. Under the model of dynamic 
decision-making agents factor the structure of other agents actions into ones own choice 
of actions in the second stage and into pricing decisions. Behaviors that conform to 
partial backward induction, however, are less sophisticated. Under this behavioral 
model, agents fail to factor their own responses into their pricing decisions. Rather, 
agents lose their identities in the pricing decision and act as if they were a 
representative agent. 
The two models about belief formation and the two models about individual decision­
making identify four general equilibrium models, three of which we operationalize. We 
identify and label these models in the following table. 
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Belief Formation 
Cournot expectations Perfect foresight 
Individual 
Decision-making 
partial backward 
induction 
dynamic 
Myopia 
Cournot 
Not Operationalized 
Rational 
Expectations 
(RE) 
These models determine 1) unit payoffs b(·) and s(-), 2) market outcomes (P, Q), and 3) 
the nature of coordination (if any) between market outcomes and unit payoffs. The RE 
model, for example, incorporates the perfect foresight hypothesis with the dynamic 
behavioral hypothesis. Behaviors in the second stage of interaction conform to the 
Nash hypothesis, Nash outcomes of the second stage imply payoffs to buyers and 
sellers, and agents factor these payoffs into their pricing decisions. Nash equilibria of 
the second stage are thus linked to equilibria in the market. 
a) A Static Rational Expectations model (RE)
RE operationalizes the concept of Simultaneous Equilibration. Under RE agents know 
the structure of the model and coordinate behaviors on outcomes of the two-stage 
process. Agents have perfect foresight: they anticipate behaviors will converge in the 
second stage of each round, and they anticipate which behaviors will obtain. More 
specifically, agents anticipate a Nash equilibrium (p*, q*) of the second stage, and they 
factor the payoffs that derive to them in their pricing decision. As under SEP, (p*� q*) 
map uniquely into equilibrium prices and volumes (P*, Q*). We label the predictions 
(P*, Q*, p*, q*) "RE-consistent." 
Mechanical Adjustment Processes 
b) Cournot ( C)
The Cournot model assigns to agents a lesser degree of rationality than RE. Agents 
assume outcomes of the two-stage process result from the active strategizing of the 
other agents in the market; in the model agents best-reply to some subset of past 
realizations of second stage play. Agents factor into their pricing decision some subset 
of past marginal frequencies (p, q) and their own best-replies to that subset of 
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frequencies. Under this model, however, agents do not factor other agents best-replies 
into their own best-replies. Rather, they assume that past frequencies characterize other 
agents' next-period choices. 
Examined here is a particular case of "Cournot expectations" where agents craft best­
replies with respect to the last realization of second-stage play. The model then predicts 
that second-stage frequencies converge on one of the RE-consistent predictions or that 
second-stage frequencies collapse into an infinite sequence of out-of-equilibrium play. 
Formally, the pair 
(pt, qt) = (pt(qt-1), qt(pt-1)), characterizes agents' strategies where 
gt = gtO denote best-reply functions, and 
(Pt, Qt) = (Pt(pt, qt), Qt(pt, qt) denotes the equilibrium in the double auction implied 
by the anticipated frequencies (pt, qt). 
Second-stage interaction converges on one of the two pure strategy equilibria of the 
two-stage process or collapses into an infinite, non-convergent sequence of out-of­
equilibrium play. The frequencies pt(qt-1) and qt(Pt-1}-may not correspond to any Nash 
equilibrium of the second stage but may generate a non-convergent sequence of mis­
coordinated play. A realization (pt-1, qt-1) = (1, 0) generates (pt, qt) = (0, 1) which in turn
generates (pt+1, qt+1) = (1, 0), and so on. On the other hand, (p2, qz) = (1,1) or (0, 0) 
generates a forward invariant sequence (pt, qt) = (p2, qz). 
The static predictions (P*, Q*, p*, q*) can be arrayed in the following table: 
Price (P*) Quantity (Q*)t Strategies (p*, q*) Surplust 
790 - 810 17 (1, 1) 8,540 
760 - 780 4 alternately (1, 0) and (0, 1) 410 
690 - 710 9 (0.75, 0.25) 1,980 
390 - 410 17 (0, 0) 8,540 
tValues correspond to the double auction conducted with 6 buyers and 6 sellers. 
Observe that the RE-consistent predictions are also Cournot-consistent. 
12 
c) Myopia
Similar to the discussion of the Cournot model, Myopia assigns to agents a lesser degree 
of rationality than Cournot, and Myopia admits the Cournot-consistent (and therefore 
RE-consistent) predictions. Under the Cournot model, price and volume anticipate the 
frequencies (p,q). Under Myopia, prices and quantities respond to previous realizations 
of second stage interaction. Effectively, agents assume that observed frequencies are 
representative of the forthcoming frequencies, and they price their units accordingly. 
Formally, Cournot satisfies 
Pt E [D(Qt) +b(pt(qt-1), qt-1)] n [S(Qt) - s(pt-1, qt(Pt-1))] 
whereas Myopia satisfies 
Pt E [D(Qt) +b(pt-1, qt-1)] n [S(Qt) - s(pt-1, qt-1)]. 
As under Cournot, agents best-reply in the second-stage of interaction to the previous 
realization (pt-1, qt-1). 
Myopia does not pin down a countable set of predictions. Note however that the 
Cournot model can be distinguished from Myopia in the data in that Cournot predicts a 
larger period-on-period volume than Myopia, because under Cournot agents factor 
there own best-replies into their own decision to buy or sell units. 
The models are summarized as follows: 
Price formation: 
1) RE: Agents factor anticipated frequencies (pt, qt) into pricing.
2) Cournot: Buyers factor (pt(qt-1), qt) and sellers factor (pt-1, qt(pt-1)) into pricing
decision. 
3) Myopia: Prices respond to latest frequencies (pt-1, qt-1).
Determination of Volume: 
1') RE: Agents factor anticipated frequencies (pt, qt) into volume. 
2') Cournot: Buyers factor (pt(qt-1), qt) and sellers factor (pt-1, qt(Pt-1)) into volume. 
3') Myopia:Volume responds to latest frequencies (pt-1, qt-1). 
Determination of second-stage behaviors: 
1") RE: Agents' behaviors jointly correspond to a Nash equilibrium 
of the second-stage process. 
2") Cournot, Myopia: Agents best-reply to previous frequencies (Pt-1, qt-1). 
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The Simultaneous Equilibration Prediction (SEP) 
Under SEP (p*, q*) constitutes a static Nash equilibrium of the second stage, and the 
behaviors (p*, q*) imply expected payoffs b(p*, q*) and s(p*, q*) to buyers and sellers. 
Agents factor these payoffs into their pricing decision in the preceding double auction. 
The usual analysis of competitive markets provides an obvious way of factoring payoffs 
into the double auction: buyers and sellers derive their demand and supply schedules 
in the preceding double auction by factoring their payoffs b(·) and s(·)into their 
marginal surplus computations. Specifically, buyers buy their kth units if they can 
secure prices which do not exceed the sum of b(p, q) and the marginal benefit of the kth 
unit. Sellers sell their kth units if they can secure prices which exceed the difference 
between the marginal cost of the kth unit and s(p, q). These derived demands and 
supplies in turn imply a unique competitive equilibrium in the double auction. The 
derived demand and supply schedules that are consistent with (p, q) = (1, 1), the Nash 
Equilibrium that corresponds to "Up-Left" are displayed in Figure 3. 
In our notation, SEP satisfies 
P* e [D(Q*) +b(p*, q*)] n [S(Q*) - s(p*, q*)] 
As above, the static predictions (P*, Q*, p*, q*) can be arrayed in the following table: 
Price (P*) Quantity (Q*)t Strategies (p*, q*) Surplust 
790 - 810 17 (1, 1) 8,540 
690 - 710 9 (0.75, 0.25) 1,980 
390 - 410 17 (0, 0) 8,540 
tValues correspond to the double auction conducted with 6 buyers and 6 s�llers. 
Whereas buyers and sellers oppositely rank the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (1, 1) and 
(0, 0) of the second stage, the surpluses available to each agent under each of the pure 
strategy equilibria (800, Q*, 1, 1) and (400, Q*, 0, 0) of the entire two-stage process are 
identical. All players rank the pure strategy equilibria above the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium (700, Q*mixed, 0.75, 0.25). 
6 Results 
The chief result of the paper is that prices, volumes, and behaviors systematically 
converge and that they converge to a state consistent with RE. Moreover, the data 
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indicate that convergence of prices lags the convergence of realizations in the second 
stage. Also, the data indicate that agents some sophistication in their pricing decisions. 
Specifically, there is evidence that they factor their own action choices in the second 
stage into their pricing decision in the preceding double-auction. 
To evaluate convergence of prices to predicted values, the following econometric model 
is enlisted: a second-order autoregressive process or AR(2) whereby 
Pt =a+P1Pt-1 +P2Pt-2 +st, 
and .Bt is assumed to be a "white noise" process. 
A 
Under this model a steady-state price P* corresponds to A a A where z = the OLS 
l-P1 -P2 
estimate.3
Result 1: In each of the experimental sessions, behaviors in the second stage of strategic 
interaction converge to one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria . 
. �upport: In 3 of 4 sessions behaviors converge to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
that corresponds to "Down, Right" or (p, q) = (0, 0). In the one other session, behaviors 
converge on the other pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that corresponds to "Up, Left" 
or (p, q) = (1, 1). 
Figure 4 exhibits the round-by-round convergence in session Feb 22 of behaviors in the 
Battle-of-the-Sexes to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium conforming to "Down­
Right." In session Feb 22, behaviors converged on (0, 0) by round 6. A single buyer 
deviated with a single unit in both of the succeeding rounds, but in the remaining 7 
rounds behaviors conformed to (p, q) = (0, 0). 
In session Feb 14, behaviors converged on (0, 0) by round 5. (See "Observed 
Frequencies" in Table 2.1) A single buyer deviated from (0, 0) in round 6, but in the 
remaining 4 rounds behaviors conformed to (0, 0). Behaviors converged to the other 
equilibrium (1, 1) in session Nov 13. Behaviors converged by round 4. In rounds 6 
through 11 some sellers deviated from the equilibrium, but behaviors conformed to (1, 
1) in the closing 7 rounds of the session. Lastly, behaviors converged on (0, 0) by round
10 of session Nov 14. A single agent deviated with 8 units in round 13, and the same 
agent deviated with 3 units in round 14, but in the remaining 4 rounds behaviors 
conformed to (0, 0). (See "Observed Frequencies" in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.) 
Result 2: In each of the experimental sessions, prices converge to RE-consistent levels. 
3 Under the assumption that the error process corresponds to white noise, the assumptions of the Gauss­
Markov theorem are satisfied, and, accordingly, OLS estimates are BLUE. 
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Support: In sessions Feb 14, Feb 22 and Nov 14, prices converged to 400, the price RE­
consistent with the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (0, 0). In session Nov 13, prices 
converged to 800, the price RE-consistent with the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
(1, 1). 
Figures 5 and 6 exhibit the convergence of prices _in sessions Feb 22 and Nov 13. Figure 
5 exhibits the prices at which units were transacted over the course of 14 market 
sessions. After each market closed, test subjects participated in a round of strategic 
interaction.. The round-on-:round relative frequency with which the outcome "Down­
Right" emerged is mapped against the right axis of Figure 5. By round 6, behaviors in 
the second stage of strategic interaction conformed to "Down-Right", and prices 
subsequently converged to the RE-consistent price of 400. In session Nov 13, prices 
converged to 800, the price that is RE-consistent with the outcome "Up-Left" to which 
behaviors converged. 
Figure 7 presents prices and behaviors from all four experimental sessions. Average 
round-on-round prices are mapped against the left axis, and the statistic (p + q), the 
round-on-round sum of observed frequencies, is mapped against the right axis. The 
condition (p + q) = 2.00 indicates that behaviors in the second stage conformed to "Up­
Left," and (p + q) = 0.00 indicates that behaviors conformed to "Down-Left." In the 
three sessions in which the statistic (p + q) converged to the value 0.00, prices 
converged to the RE-consistent price 400. In session Nov 13 (p + q) converged to 2.00, 
and average prices converged on the corresponding price of 800. 
To substantiate the convergence of prices, we apply the AR(2) model to the price series 
that begin with the period succeeding the one in which behaviors in the second stage 
first lined up with a Nash equilibrium. For example, in the first session all action 
choices lined up with "Down, Right" for the first time in period 4. We argue that the 
data generating process shifts from one regime to another once agents begin to 
coordinate on an outcome in the second stage of strategic interaction. For the same 
reason, we apply the AR(2) to data commencing with period 7 in the second session, 
and to data commencing with periods 5 and 11 in sessions 3 and 4, respectively. 
The AR(2) model Pt =a+ P1Pt-1 + P2Pt-2 + Bt generates estimates of the steady-state 
price that are consistent with the hypothesis that the prices are converging to 400 in 
sessions 1, 2, and 4, and to 800 in session Nov 13. The estimates of the steady-state 
prices from each session all lie within 1.33 standard deviations of the hypothesized 
steady-state prices. (See Table 4.) 
Admittedly, we would prefer to model the entire data generating process either by 
endogenizing the regime shift or developing a different model that would incorporate 
all of the price data. However, our immediate purpose is to quantify the notion that 
prices ''converge." 
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Figure 5 exhibits the convergence of prices to RE-consistent price of 400 in the 
experimental session Feb 22. Behaviors in the game converged to the pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium corresponding to "Down-Left," and prices subsequently converged. 
To substantiate the notion of "regime shift" in the data generating process, we also 
include in Table 4 F-statistics corresponding to Chow's test for structural change in the 
price series. "Large" values support the hypothesis that the data generating process has 
changed from one segment of the price series to the next, and three our F-statistics are 
indeed significant at the 1 % level. The fourth is significant at the 5 % level. 
Result 3: In each of the experimental sessions, volumes converge to RE-consistent 
levels. 
Support: We apply a statistical criterion that indicates that volumes in all four sessions 
converge to RE-consistent levels. We apply an ARMA(l, 2) of the form Qt= a1d1 + a2d2 
+ a3d3 + a4d4 + J3Qt-l + ut where ut = p1 ut-l + p2ut_2 + st, st is assumed to conform to the
usual "white noise" process, and the terms di are dummy variables identifying each of 
fue four experimental sessions. The model generates steady-state predictions of 
volumes in each of the four sessions that cannot be statistically distinguished from the 
RE-consistent predictions of volumes. (See statistical tests in Table 6.) 
The ARMA(l,2) employs 57 observations of volumes of 61 of the observations 
generated from all four experimental sessions. Four observations are omitted in order 
to accommodate the single lag on volume Qt_1. The model pools the data to generate an 
estimate of the effect of the lag, but the four dummy variables permit estimation of an 
"intercept" ai for each of the four experimental sessions. 
The next result characterizes the evolution of prices in the system. Principally, the 
convergence of prices lags the convergence of behaviors in the game. The lag of prices 
itself suggests that prices respond to the equilibrium realizations that emerge in the 
second stage. 
Two measures of the lag are articulated. First, it is observed that within the first 4 
rounds of each experimental session behaviors on at least one side of the market make 
initial contact with the equilibrium of the second stage that subsequently obtains, and 
prices subsequently converge. Secondly, the AR(2) model of the evolution of prices 
employed in Result 1 substantiates the follow-on convergence of prices. 
Result 4: In all four experimental sessions, the convergence of prices to RE-consistent 
values lags the convergence of behaviors to pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
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Support: Figure 7 indicates the convergence of behaviors in the second stage and the 
follow-on convergence of prices. Within the first four rounds of all four sessions, 
behaviors on the side of the market receiving 700 in the equilibrium of the second stage 
game make initial contact with the equilibrium that eventually obtains. In sessions Feb 
14, Feb 22, and Nov 14, sellers actions all conform to "Right" ( q = 0) in the first round, 
the fourth round, and the fourth round, respectively. In each of the three sessions 
behaviors in the second stage subsequently converge to the equilibrium conforming to 
"Down," "Right". By the fourth stage, prices have yet to converge. Average prices in 
the fourth round of each of these sessions were 780, 631, and 582. Prices in each of these 
sessions eventually converged to 400. In session Nov 13 the equilibrium conforming to 
"Up," "Left" eventually obtained. In this case, buyers actions first made contact with 
the equilibrium behaviors (p = 1) by round 3. Average prices were 720, well short of the 
equilibrium price of 800. 
The AR(2) model Pt= a+ p1Pt-l + p2Pt_2 +Et employed in the discussion of Result 1 
articulates the remainder of the experience of prices. The data support the hypothesis 
that the price series in each of the four experimental sessions exhibit structural shift by 
the time behaviors on both sides of the market first make contact with a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium of the second stage. The estimates of the coefficients on the lagged 
prices (P1 and P2) after convergence in behaviors are statistically significant, indicating 
that prices experience substantial evolution after behaviors have already converged. 
(Once again, regression results are presented in Table 4.) 
Result 5 provides a clue about the strategic sophistication agents exercise, and it 
suggests that their behaviors can be partially characterized by backward induction. 
First, the result suggest that agents use the latest realizations of the second stage game 
to form expectations about the next stage. More importantly, however, the result 
suggests that agents are sophisticated enough 1) to factor expected payoffs into their 
pricing decisions -- they apply backward induction -- and 2) to factor there own best­
replies to expected behaviors into their calculations of expected payoffs. 
Result 5: The Cournot model characterizes the evolution of prices with markedly more 
success than the RE and Myopia models. 
Support: The data indicate that the Cournot model predicts price intervals that capture 
82.46% of the prices on the last units transacted in each round. The Myopia and RE 
models generate predictions that are consistent with 35.09% and 24.59% of the same 
data, respectively. 
To characterize the agreement of observed prices with the various price predictions, we 
tailor a series nt to each the Cournot model, Myopia, and RE where 
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Pt = the price of the last unit traded in period t, 
[Et0,Pt0] is the interval of prices consistent with the given model in period t,
" Pt(-}+Pt0 
[ - ] . Pt()= 2 -
is the midpoint of the interval Et(),Pt()J , and
functions gt(·) are specific to each model. 
Under RE gt(-) is a function of the (anticipated) marginal frequencies (pt, qt), whereas 
under Cournot gt(-) is a function of both the observed frequencies (pt-1, qt-1) and the best­
replies pt(qt-1) and qt(pt-1) to them, and under Myopia gt(·) is a function of the observed 
f_!equencies (Pt-1, qt-1). 
Observe that a value of nt in the interval [-1, 1] indicates that the observed last price Pt is 
consistent with the models under examination. If we define nt E [-1, 1] as a "success" 
for trial t, we find that the RE model registers 15 succ€sses out of 61 trials (24.59%). The 
Cournot process, however, captures 47 out of 57 available observations (82.46% ), and 
Myopia registers 20 successes out of 57 trials (35.09% ). (See Table 5.1.) 
Figure 8 presents the distribution of the series I nt I for each of the models. The 
cumulative density of Int I generated under each model is mapped against Int I itself. 
Each cumulative density is bounded above at 100%. At Int I = 1, the density generated 
under the Cournot model captures 82% of the data. 
Under the Cournot model agents best-reply to previous frequencies (pt-1, qt-1), and they 
determine price and volume by factoring the last period's frequencies and their best­
replies to those frequencies into their calculations. The "Predicted Prices" in Tables 3.1 
through 3.4 indicate the price margins that are consistent with the realization that 
emerged. 
The RE model generates a series nt that is almost uniformly distributed around nt = 0, 
the value of nt that corresponds to predictions centered precisely on the observed last 
price Pt. The Cournot model, however, generates predictions that are more tightly 
packed. The median absolute divergence of nt from zero under the RE and Myopia 
models exceeds 2. That is, under these models the mid-point of more than half the 
predicted prices diverges from the data by more than 1 price interval. Further, the 
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standard deviation of the 7tt series is nearly one-half or one-third the standard 
deviations of the series generated under the other three models. (See Table 5.2.) 
One of the salient behavioral phenomena the models do not capture is the deviation, 
usually by a single agent, in the second stage of interaction from a pure strategy 
equilibrium of the second stage after convergence has initially been achieved. 
Nonetheless, the largest deviations of 7tt from the observed prices do not correspond to 
the deviations from Nash equilibria of the second stage. In the experimental session of 
November 13, for example, the largest absolute values of 7tt under the Cournot model 
correspond to periods 7 and 10. Neither of these periods corresponds to a period 
following a "deviation." The average absolute deviation of 7tt from 0 under the 
Cournot model is 1.49. That is, on average 7tt diverges from 0 by more than half a 
Cournot-consistent price interval. The average deviation of the data less the two largest 
deviations is 0.68. That is, if we exclude the largest deviations from our calculations, we 
find that on average 7tt diverges from 0 by a magnitude that is Cournot-consistent. 
'J.. Conclusion 
What happens when players buy the right to play a game? There is a body of 
experimental evidence, including the research presented here, that suggests that what 
happens depends systematically on features of the larger institutional context in which 
games are embedded. 
Price coordination mechanisms have been the focus of attention of several studies. In 
the experiments of Van Huyck, Battalio and Beit agents participate in a market through 
which the right to participate in a second stage of interaction is distributed. In their 
experiments market volume is predetermined and the structure of payoffs is common 
knowledge. In Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993), 18 agents bid for 9 units 
where each unit entitles the owner one action choice in a 9-player coordination game. 
In this framework, a forward-induction model entails mapping prices into Nash 
equilibria in an obvious way.4
The framework we present is less accommodating. In the framework presented here 
agents do not know the entire structure of the two-stage apparatus: they know their 
own marginal cost or marginal redemption value schedules, and they commonly know 
the structure of the second stage process, but they do not know the demand and supply 
schedules. Accordingly, it is not obvious how agents might use prices to signal 
4. For references consult Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990, 1991, 1993), Crawford (1990, 1995), Crawford
and Broseta (1995), and Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993, 1994). 
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behaviors in the second stage. How would, for example, an agent know that a price of 
800 is consistent (in our RE model) with the outcome CUp," "Left")? 
The first three results indicate that behaviors converge to RE-consistent equilibria, and 
the remaining results begin to illuminate the dynamic processes by which behaviors 
converge. From Result 4 one sees that agents do not coordinate behaviors in the game 
via equilibrium prices. Rather, the convergence of prices in the double auction lags . 
convergence of behaviors in the second stage. Result 5 indicates that prices respond to 
realizations in the game. Specifically, the data indicate that agents factor their own 
actions in the second stage into their pricing decisions in the first stage. Finally, the 
conjecture presented above suggests that agents expectations of realizations in the game 
become aligned after the opening stages of the game. Agents indicate that in the early 
rounds they anticipate a particular pure-strategy equilibrium of the second stage and, 
accordingly, they jointly bid up volumes in the early rounds and start coordinating on 
one of the two pure-strategy equilibria of the second stage. The sensitivity of agents to 
different payoffs remains and even after many periods some of them attempt to 
unilaterally motivate a shift from one equilibrium to the other. All of these attempts to 
. unilaterally manipulate the selection of equilibria fail. 
We speculate that both learning dynamics and solution concepts, whether new or 
traditional, can be systematically linked to attributes of the institutional context in 
which games are embedded. That is, we suggest that the issue of equilibrium can be 
naturally embedded within the larger issue of the institutional sensitivity of equilibria. 
In this context the research makes progress in characterizing a mapping from 
institutions into learning dynamics and into equilibria. First and foremost, the research 
demonstrates that agents' behaviors converge on static outcomes that are consistent not 
merely with a Nash prediction of behaviors in a static game but are consistent with a 
joint application of supply-demand analysis and Nash predictions. While none of the 
models completely characterize the learning and dynamics exhibited in the 
experimental data, one model out-performs all of the others. That model is one in 
which agents best-reply to some subset of past realizations of strategic interaction and in 
which agents factor their own actions into future realizations. This model outperforms 
those in which agents fail to factor their own actions into their calculus and those in 
which agents forecast (perfectly) other agents' actions. 
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Session Buyers:Sellers Price 
790-810 
1 4:4 690-710 
390-410 
790-810 
2 6:6 690-710 
390-410 
790-810 
r, 3 5:5 690-710 
390-410 
790-810 
4 7:7 690-710 
390-410 
Table 1: Static RE Predictions 
Nash Equilibrium 
Volume Frequencies (p, q) of Second Stage 
12 (1, 1) Up, Left 
6 (0.75, 0.25) Mixed 
12 (0, 0) Down, Right 
17 (1, 1) Up, Left 
9 (0.75, 0.25) Mixed 
17 (0, 0) Down, Right 
14 (1, 1) Up, Left 
7 (0.75, 0.25) Mixed 
14 (0, 0) Down, Right 
21 (1, 1) Up, Left 
11 (0.75, 0.25) Mixed 
21 (0, 0) Down, Right 
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Per Unit Surplus 
Buyers Sellers Total 
329.17 140.83 470.00 
143.33 58.33 201.67 
329.17 140.83 470.00 
352.35 150.00 502.35 
156.67 63.33 220.00 
352.35 150.00 502.35 
347.86 147.86 495.71 
167.14 67.14 234.29 
347.86 147.86 495.71 
331.43 141.90 473.33 
142.73 58.18 200.91 
331.43 141 .90 473.33 
Observed 
Round Frequencies (p, q 
1 (1.00 / 0.00) 
2 (0.50 / 0.33) 
3 (0.63 / 0.25) 
4 (0,50 / 0.00) 
5 (0.00 / 0.00) 
6 (0.33 / 0.00) 
7 (0.00 / 0.00) 
8 (0,00 / 0.00) 
9 (0.00 / 0.00) 
10 (0.00 / 0.00) 
Observed 
Round Frequencies (p, q) 
1 (0.57 / 0.36) 
2 (0.60 / 0.07) 
3 (0.27 I 0.09) 
4 (0.35 / 0.00) 
5 (0.08 / 0.00) 
6 (0,00 / 0.00) 
7 (0.07 / 0.00) 
8 (0.07 / 0.00) 
9 (0.00 / 0.00) 
10 (0,00 / 0.00) 
11 (0.00 / 0.00) 
12 (0,00 / 0.00) 
13 (0.00 / 0.00) 
14 (0.00 / 0.00) 
Table 2.1: February 14 Results 
Average Payoffs Observed Per Unit Surplus Extracted 
Buyers 
100.00 
266.67 
325.00 
200.00 
300.00 
233.33 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
Sellers Avg Price Volume Buyers 
100.00 836 5 -148 
333.33 842 6 -35 
375.00 833 6 -133 
400.00 780 6 -16 
700.00 734 9 147 
500.00 644 9 114 
700.00 574 9 250 
700.00 480 9 344 
700.00 459 9 365 
700.00 411 11 345 
Table 2.2: February 22 Results 
Sellers Total 
-4 -152 
280 245 
315 181 
563 547 
315 462 
168 282 
330 580 
194 538 
228 593 
161 505 
Per Unit Surplus Extracted 
Average Payoffs Observed 
Buyers Sellers Avg Price Volume Buyers Sellers Total 
285.71 314.29 742 14 -89 50 -39 
166.67 300.00 725 15 -63 -43 -106 
300.00 554.55 692 11 129 286 415 
229.41 488.24 631 17 1 96 96 
284.62 653.85 535 13 287 240 527 
300.00 700.00 425 11 406 194 600 
286.67 660.00 369 15 377 93 470 
286.67 660.00 344 15 389 64 453 
300.00 700.00 355 17 367 95 462 
300.00 700.00 361 17 389 101 489 
300.00 700.00 386 15 411 152 563 
300.00 700.00 398 16 376 156 533 
300.00 700.00 402 16 372 153 525 
300.00 700.00 402 16 372 157 529 
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System. 
Efficiency 
-13.48% 
26 .06% 
19.28% 
58.16% 
73.67% 
45.04% 
92.55% 
85.82% 
94.68% 
98.58% 
System. 
Efficiency 
-6.44% 
-18.65% 
53.49% 
19.20% 
80.21% 
77.28% 
82.55% 
79.63% 
92.04% 
97.42% 
98.95% 
99.77% 
98.36% 
99.06% 
Observed 
Round Frequencies (p, q) 
1 (0.43 ' 0.86) 
2 (0.90 ' 0.80) 
3 (0.78 ' 1 .00) 
4 (1 .00 ' 1 ,00) 
· 5 (1 .00 ' 1 .00) 
6 (0.73 ' 1 .00) 
7 (0.71 ' 1 .00) 
8 (0.64 ' 1.00) 
9 (0.73 ' 1 .00) 
10 (0.75 ' 1 .00) 
11 (0.77 ' 1 .00) 
12 (1 .00 ' 1 .00) 
13 (1.00 ' 1 .00) 
14 (1 .00 ' 1.00) 
15 (1 .00 ' 1 .00) 
16 (1 .00 ' 1 .00) 
17 (1.00 ' 1 .00) 
18' (1 .00 ' 1 .00) 
19 (1.00 ' 1 .00) 
Observed 
Round Frequencies (p, q) 
1 (0.63 ' 0.19) 
2 (0.33 ' 0.40) 
3 (0.63 ' 0.13) 
4 (0.44 ' 0.00) 
5 (0.29 ' 0.00) 
6 (0.24 ' 0.06) 
7 (0.06 ' 0.00) 
8 (0.20 ' 0.00) 
9 (0.15 ' 0.00) 
10 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
11 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
12 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
13 (0.38 ' 0.00) 
14 (0.12 ' 0.00) 
15 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
16 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
17 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
18 (0.00 ' 0.00) 
Table 2.3: November 13 Results 
Per Unit Surplus Extracted 
Average Payoffs Observed 
Buyers Sellers Avg Price Volume Buyers 
271.43 157.14 838 7 48 
600.00 320.00 728 10 264 
566.67 255.56 720 9 346 
700.00 300.00 724 11 375 
700.00 300.00 730 17 282 
536.36 245.45 746 11 221 
528.57 242.86 739 14 226 
481.82 227.27 751 11 127 
536.36 245.45 755 11 200 
550.00 250.00 751 12 216 
561.54 253.85 752 13 188 
700.00 300.00 751 15 344 
700.00 300.00 753 15 355 
700.00 300.00 765 14 364 
700.00 300.00 770 12 410 
700.00 300.00 782 12 408 
700.00 300.00 786 16 297 
700.00 300.00 790 15 319 
700.00 300.00 805 15 302 
Table 2.4: November 14 Results 
Sellers Total 
93 141 
125 389 
9 354 
85 460 
11 293 
53 275 
2 228 
34 161 
73 273 
71 287 
60 248 
89 433 
81 436 
107 471 
124 534 
152 560 
101 398 
123 442 
140 442 
Per Unit Surplus Extracted 
Average Payoffs Observed 
Buyers Sellers Avg Price Volume Buyers Sellers Total 
287.50 362.50 555 16 248 -94 154 
206.67 313.33 588 15 138 -28 111 
200.00 300.00 576 16 131 -97 34 
212.50 437.50 582 16 141 46 187 
241.18 523.53 546 17 187 82 269 
241.18 523.53 545 17 198 122 320 
288.89 666.67 533 18 236 226 462 
260.00 580.00 510 20 180 110 290 
270.00 610.00 465 20 250 100 350 
300.00 700.00 453 18 317 168 485 
300.00 700.00 440 20 304 159 463 
300.00 700.00 438 21 288 144 432 
223.81 471.43 441 21 183 -50 134 
276.47 629.41 442 17 331 117 447 
300.00 700.00 443 18 342 179 521 
300.00 700.00 436 20 309 156 465 
300.00 700.00 412 22 304 143 447 
300.00 700.00 431 19 333 165 498 
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System 
Efficiency 
1.4.27% 
56.05% 
45.97% 
72.91% 
71.76% 
43.52% 
45.97% 
25.58% 
43.23% 
49.57% 
46.54% 
93.52% 
94.24% 
95.10% 
92.36% 
96.83% 
91.79% 
95.53% 
95.53% 
System 
Efficiency 
24.75% 
16.70% 
5.53% 
30.08% 
45.98% 
54.73% 
83.60% 
58.25% 
70.32% 
87.83% 
93.16% 
91.35% 
28.27% 
76.46% 
94.37% 
93.46% 
98.89% 
95.27% 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Table 3.1: February 14 Predictions 
Price Predictions Volume Predictions 
RE Cournot Myopia RE 
760 - 780 2 
627 - 707 660 - 740 760 - 780 8 
660 - 690 560 - 740 627 - 707 8 
390 - 410 560 - 740 660 - 690 12 
460 - 673 390 - 410 390 - 410 8 
460 - 673 520 - 580 460 - 673 8 
390 - 410 520 - 580 460 - 673 12 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 12 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 12 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 12 
Table 3.2: February 22 Predictions 
Cournot Myopia 
8 2 
8 8 
8 8 
12 12 
9 8 
9 8 
12 12 
12 12 
12 12 
Price Predictions Volume Predictions 
RE Cournot Myopia RE Cournot Myopia 
654 - 718 11 
628 - 639 633 - 674 654 - 718 11 12 11 
518 - 527 620 - 727 628 - 639 14 11 11 
502 - 589 484 - 562 518 - 527 12 14 14 
396 - 485 532 - 580 502 - 589 15 14 12 
390 - 410 396 - 500 396 - 485 17 15 15 
390 - 487 390 - 410 390 - 410 15 17 17 
390 - 487 390 - 500 390 - 487 15 15 15 
390 - 410 390 - 500 390 - 487 17 15 15 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 17 17 17 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 17 17 17 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 17 17 17 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 17 17 17 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 17 17 17 
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Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
·10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Table 3.3: November 13 Predictions 
Price Predictions Volume Predictions 
RE Cournot Myopia RE 
738 - 777 9 
764 - 816 647 - 724 738 - 777 11 
764 - 847 770 - 780 764 - 816 11 
790 - 810 794 - 900 764 - 847 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
775 - 816 790 - 810 790 - 810 11 
777 - 809 816 - 820 775 - 816 11 
763 - 842 809 - 820 777 - 809 10 
775 - 816 772 - 810 763 - 842 11 
770 - 830 819 - 820 775 - 816 11 
766 - 842 800 - 900 770 - 830 11 
790 - 810 796 - 900 766 - 842 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
790 - 810 790 - 810 790 - 810 14 
Table 3.4: November 14 Predictions 
Cournot Myopia 
16 9 
12 11 
12 11 
14 14 
14 14 
13 11 
13 11 
14 10 
13 11 
12 11 
12 11 
14 14 
14 14 
14 14 
14 14 
14 14 
14 14 
14 14 
Price Predictions Volume Predictions 
RE Cournot Myopia RE Cournot Myopia 
654 - 671 13 
593 - 700 635 - 703 654 - 671 13 13 13 
648 - 653 520 - 620 593 - 700 13 16 13 
553 - 573 635 - 715 648 - 653 14 13 13 
496 - 521 553 - 660 553 - 573 16 14 14 
485 - 532 496 - 580 496 - 521 16 16 16 . 
383 - 489 461 - 568 485 - 532 18 16 16 
440 - 540 414 - 420 383 - 489 16 19 18 
440 - 470 470 - 500 440 - 540 18 18 16 
390 - 410 440 - 500 440 - 470 21 18 18 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 21 21 21 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 21 21 21 
519 - 584 390 - 410 390 - 410 14 21 21 
421 - 476 549 - 580 519 - 584 18 16 14 
390 - 410 421 - 500 421 - 476 21 18 18 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 21 21 21 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 21 21 21 
390 - 410 390 - 410 390 - 410 21 21 21 
26 
N 
-...J 
Experimental 
Session 
Feb 14 
Feb 22 
Nov 13 
Nov 14 
Periods 
1 - 3
4 - 10 
1 - 4
5 - 15 
1 - 3
4 - 19 
1 - 8
9 - 18 
Observations a. 
1 - 28 415.51 
(2.82) 
29 - 98 21.44 
(1.01) 
1 - 58 592.55 
(4.42) 
59 - 209 46.28 
(3.16) 
1 - 28 660.79 
(2.61) 
29 - 273 329.72 
(6.96) 
1 - 178 298.31 
(6.11) 
179 - 405 211.74 
(6.52) 
Table 4: The Convergence of Prices . 
P1  P2 
0.70 -0.23 
(3.43) (-1.14) 
0.67 0.27 
(5.70) (2.36) 
0.03 0.09 
(0.24) (0.69) 
0.64 0.24 
(8.11) (3.05) 
0.16 -0.06 
(0.21) (0.31) 
0.34 0.23 
(5.59) (4.24) 
0.23 0.23 
(3.08) (3.21) 
0.25 0.27 
(3.94) (4.16) 
P* 
P =
400 
400 
800 
400 
A 
� 
A A 
1 - P 1 - P 2  
406.37 
384.13 
763.78 
440.76 
Standard t-statistic DW Chow test 
Error P - P *  statistic F3,n-6 
crp tn_3 = --O'p 
2.08 6.68 
(F3,92 1 % = 4.02) 
39.56 0.16 2.16 
2.02 20.03 
(F3,203 1 % = 3.78) 
26.15 -0.61 2.02 
2.01 4.46 
(F3,w13 = 3.78) 
28.65 -1.26 2.16 
2.01 19.45 
(F3,397 1% = 3.78) 
25.59 1.59 1.92 
Table 5.1
7tt / ni l 
Median mean std. dev. median mean std. dev. 
RE 0.00 -0.07 10.81 2.22 4.85 9.65 
Cournot -0.15 -0.90 4.61 0.48 1 .49 4.45 
Myopia -0.57 -0.83 8.55 2.03 3.93 7.62 
Table 5.2
"trials" "successes" Deviations from Observed Volume "successes" 
I 7t1 I ::;; 1 0 units ::;; 1 unit ::;; 2 units ::;; 3 units sign(�Q1) 
RE 61 24.59% 14.75% 45.90% 68.85% 90.16% 52.63% 
Cournot 57 82.46% 19.30% 50.88% 75.44% 96.49% 40.74% 
Myopia 57 35.09% 17.54% 47.37% 71 .93% 91.23% 37.04% 
28 
Equations: 
Regressor 
N I "" 
Feb 14 Dummy: dl 
Feb 22 Dummy: d2 
Nov 13 Dummy: �
Nov 14 Dummy: �
Volume1-1 
Ut-1 
Ut-2 
Std. Error of Volume!' crv 
DW-statistic 
Table 6
Volume1 = a1� + a2d2+ a3d3+ a4d4+ �Volume1_1 + ut'
ut = P1U1-1 + P2U1-2 + ct' 
ML Coefficent 
Estimates 
A p A a u ,pi 
3.16 
5.16 
4.60 
6.41 
0.66 
-0.46 
-0.28 
1.83 
2.09 
c1 � N(O,cr2) 
Std. Error 
0.7737 
1 .3363 
1.1416 
1.6541 
0.0889 
0.1273 
0.1273 
Estimated 
Session Volume 
A 
A a, .  v. = -1-1 1 - p 
9.43 
15.38 
13.72 
19.09 
Predicted t-ratio: 
Session Volume 
(\�vv,J V. l 
12 -1.41 
17 -0.89 
14 -0.15 
21 -1.04 
w 0 
Figure 1 
Supply and Demand Schedules 
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These are the schedules that would obtain with a configuration of 6 buyers and 6 sellers. 
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Figure 2 
Seller Actions 
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Figur� 3 
Derived Supply and Demand Schedules 
RE-consistent with the "Up-Left" Equilibrium · 
of the Second Stage Game 
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Behaviors in Session Feb 22
Converge to the pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium "Down-Right" 
Period 1 · Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
L R L R L R L R L R 
u 3 5 u 0 9 u 1 2 u 0 6 u 0 1 
D 2 4 D 1 5 D 0 8 D 0 11 D 0 12 
Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10 
L R L R L R L R L R 
u 0 0 u 0 1 u 0 1 u 0 0 u 0 0 
D 0 11 D 0 14 D 0 14 D 0 17 D 0 17 
Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 
L R L R L R L R 
u 0 0 u 0 0 u 0 0 u 0 0 
D 0 . 15 D 0 16 D 0 16 D 0 16 
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Figure 5 
Prices and Behaviors Converge to the RE-Consistent Values 
(400, "Down-Right") on Feb 22 
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Figure 6 
Prices and Behaviors Converge to the RE-Consistent ·Values 
(800, "Up-Left") on Nov 13 
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Figure 7 
Prices and the Sum of Frequencies (p +q) Converge to 
Joint Rational-Expectations Equilbria 
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Figure 8 
The Cournot process characterizes the evolution of prices 
with more success than the Myopia and RE processes 
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